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Résumé / Abstract
Nous étudions les situations où (1) un agent doit distribuer ses efforts (qui ne peuvent être
observés par des tiers) sur différentes tâches et où (2) plusieurs parties prenantes ont des points de vue
divergents quant à la distribution la plus souhaitable. La théorie économique prédit actuellement que
chacun de ces ingrédients – la présence de tâches multiples et la concurrence entre parties prenantes -
suffit à lui seul à abaisser considérablement la puissance des incitations. Ce papier propose néanmoins un
remède simple, via l’utilisation d’audits contingents. Le mécanisme proposé rendrait en effet les tâches
complémentaires du point de vue de l’agent ; en même temps, les parties prenantes parviendraient à se
coordonner pour le mettre en oeuvre, à condition que l’aversion au risque de l’agent décroisse
suffisamment vite avec l’augmentation de sa richesse. Cette coordination pourrait par ailleurs se réaliser
d’une manière «libérale», en ce sens que certaines parties prenantes n’auraient besoin de contrôler que les
tâches les intéressant directement. Certaines utilisations possibles du mécanisme pour les régimes de
conformité des entreprises, l’organisation des gouvernements, et le management de l’innovation sont
brièvement esquissées., nous trouvons des changements dans la dynamique et dans la mémoire longue de
la volatilité.
This paper considers situations where an agent must allocate his nonobservable effort among
several tasks and where several principals hold diverging viewpoints on what the best allocation should
be. Economic theory currently sees each of these features as major obstacles to raising the strength of an
agent’s incentives. This paper proposes a simple scheme - based on contingent monitoring - that can
nevertheless mitigate both of these obstacles simultaneously. Under this scheme, if the agent’s absolute
risk aversion decreases fast enough with respect to wealth, then the principals would coordinate their
respective incentive provision so that the agent would also see his various tasks as complementary
(instead of substitute) income-enhancing activities. Furthermore, coordination could be achieved in a
somewhat “liberal” or decentralized way, in the sense that some principals would need to control only the
tasks they have assigned to the agent. Potential applications to corporate compliance, the organization of
government, and the management of innovation are briefly discussed.
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2“No man ill hold to the one and despise the other”
[St Matthew, 6, 24]
A common agency is a situation where several principals have a stake in the actions
of a particular agent. Such a situation occurs frequently in economic life. Shareholders and
public regulators, for instance, are both affected by some decisions implemented by a
corporate head office. The White House and Members of Congress are jointly concerned by
the way public policies are refined and enforced at the Department of Justice or the
Environmental Protection Agency. Production and marketing departments of a
manufacturing firm must both cope with the designs provided by the R&D department.
In those situations it is natural to expect that each principal will try to influence the
agent’s actions. The latter will thus face a set of separate contracts, each one being designed
in order to align the agent’s preferences with those of a specific principal. Several
researchers have now examined this set of contracts (see Avinash Dixit, 1996, and Jean
Tirole, 2001, for recent surveys). An important conclusion is that it would normally yield
low-powered incentives, i.e. the agent’s overall payoff would turn out to be relatively
insensitive to output.1 This conclusion is based on the presence of two major obstacles.2
First, as shown by Dixit (1996), competing principals with different objectives might
counter each others’ incentive scheme by encouraging effort only on those peculiar tasks
that matter to oneself while insuring the risk averse agent against (sometimes even
rewarding him for!) underperforming on the remaining tasks. Second, even if the principals
                                                          
1 This theoretically-based assertion is consistent, for instance, with the relatively flat wages received by
the vast majority of employees in public organizations, and with the relatively weaker managerial
incentives that prevail in countries favorable to a stakeholder view of the firm. The former observation
is discussed by Dixit, 1996; the latter by Tirole, 2001.
2 An additional one would be the fuzziness of missions and lack of focus that the presence of several
active principals often entails (as argued by Mathias Dewatripont, Ian Jewitt and Tirole, 1999). This
obstacle raises important behavioral issues (communication, framing, etc.) that are unfortunately
beyond the scope of this paper.
3did cooperate, the agent’s job would typically consist in a collection of heterogenous tasks,
some of which being more difficult to monitor than others; in this context previous work by
Oliver E. Williamson (1985), Bengt Holmström and Paul Milgrom (1991), George Baker
(2001), and others indicate that strong output-based incentives would lead the agent to
neglect all the tasks but those which look relatively easier to appraise.
This paper now proposes a simple incentive scheme that deals with both of these
obstacles simultaneously. This scheme can be described briefly as follows. Consider two
principals, labeled a and b, who respectively assign task A and task B to a common agent.
Let principal a monitor task A and pay the agent according to output on this task. Let
principal b commit to measure performance on task B, and to compensate the agent, only
when current output on task A gets above a certain prespecified level. Compensation from
principal b varies according to the observed return on both tasks, the agent being penalized
after displaying low performance on task B; it is set, however, such that ex ante the agent
would seek principal b’s appraisal.
Intuitively, this scheme can mitigate the two obstacles mentioned above -
multitasking and competing principals - for the following reasons. First, it makes the
amounts of effort expended on tasks A and B complementary in increasing the agent’s total
compensation. To be sure, the agent is now eager to work harder on task A because this not
only raises the expected reward from principal a but also the likelihood of an appraisal by
principal b. Seeking principal b’s intervention, however, makes little sense if task B is
neglected. The agent would therefore not increase his effort on one task without putting
more attention as well on the other task. The tendency to overspecialize which characterizes
multitasking and hampers incentive provision in that context is henceforth alleviated. As
long as the agent sees tasks A and B as complementary, furthermore, the incentives set by
one principal on her preferred task will also benefit the other principal. This (designed)
4positive externality counterbalances an inherent negative one - all things equal, stronger
incentives to work on one task raise the agent’s opportunity cost of putting extra time
elsewhere, making it more expensive to provide incentives on the other task - that
competition between principals tends to exacerbate. It then becomes easier for the principals
to coordinate their respective incentive provision.
This conclusion departs from the ones suggested by the usual analyses of common
agency. In their seminal article, for instance, Douglas Bernheim and Michael D. Whinston
(1986) have shown that competing principals can coordinate on a cooperative outcome if
and only if there would be no incentive problems were the principals to collude (or if, in
other words, nonobservability of the agent’s effort per se does not cause welfare losses).
And more recently, using a multi-principal extension of Holmström and Milgrom (1991)’s
multitask principal-agent model, Dixit (1996) has proved that total incentive compensation
would exhibit the wage gradient arising under a single principal divided by the number of
competing principals. A closer look at these similar conclusions indicates, however, that
they might be due to the predominance of one type of externality between principals.1 In the
former article a principal incurs the cost but shares with the other principals the benefit of
providing stronger incentives; this creates a free-rider problem which induces a further
decrease in the strength of incentives when the principals compete.2 In the latter, on the
other hand, a principal’s incentive scheme may not benefit the other principals but it always
raises their incentive provision cost. These are instances of respectively positive and
negative externalities. In this paper, by contrast, both types of externalities are made to
coexist and to offset each other (at least partially).
                                                          
1 This diagnostic was recently spelled out with considerable precision and generality by Ilya Segal
(1999).
2 Bernheim and Whinston (1986)’s analysis of common agency is actually more general than the latter
statement suggests. I refer here to the “effort” version of their model that they discuss on pages 935-6.
5There is of course a “price” to pay to achieve such a scenario. For instance, the
proposed scheme builds on the presumption that the principals have agreed beforehand on
which task will be subject to contingent appraisals (i.e. which task will stand as task B) and
which task will be monitored continuously. It is also supposed that principal b would be as
capable as principal a to observe the output on task A. Furthermore, one key hypothesis had
to be brought in so that a rational principal would be willing to use contingent monitoring:
the agent’s risk aversion must decrease sufficiently fast with respect to wealth.1 If this were
not the case, then a principal would find it too expensive to offer the agent a sharing rule
based on the output on task B that looks attractive ex ante. The (albeit stylized) examples
which are discussed below suggest nevertheless that the assumptions made here might not
exclude some significant applications.
The paper unfolds as follows. Notation, basic definitions and technical assumptions
are set out in the following section. Section II analyzes the conflict between principals and
argues that the introduction of task complementarity would mitigate this problem. A
contingent monitoring scheme that can induce task complementarity is introduced in
Section III, and conditions under which it could constitute a common agency equilibrium are
spelled out. Section IV outlines potential applications of the proposed scheme to corporate
compliance, the internal organization of government, and the management of innovation.
Section V contains concluding remarks.
                                                          
1 More precisely, the agent’s coefficient of absolute prudence (as defined in Miles S. Kimball, 1990)
must be greater than three times his coefficient of absolute risk aversion.
6I. NOTATION, DEFINITIONS AND FORMAL ASSUMPTIONS
This section sets the basic formal framework of the paper. The simplest instance of
a common agency - that with only two principals and two tasks - is laid out, for it can
convey the main ideas while keeping notation and computations to a minimum. Possible
generalizations to an arbitrary number of principals and tasks are discussed in a companion
paper (Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné, 1999).
From now on let us then consider a one-shot contractual relationship between one
agent and two principals. On the one hand, principal a assigns a task A to the agent. The
latter’s effort on that task - noted a (³ 0), is imperfectly observable through an output level
ai , where i = 0, 1,..., I and ai is increasing in its index; the likelihood of observing output ai
when the agent delivers an effort a is written pi(a). Principal b, on the other hand, expects
the agent to also work on a task B. Again, the agent’s effort on B - noted b (³ 0) - can only
be inferred imperfectly from an output level bj , where j = 0, 1,..., J and bj increases in j. The
linkage between effort and output in this case is captured by the conditional probability
q j(b) of observing output level j given effort b. Thereafter, the functions pi(a) and q j(b) are
assumed to be positive and twice continuously differentiable in (a,b).
Each principal seeks to influence the agent’s effort allocation via an incentive
contract. The agent is risk averse, with positive, strictly concave, strictly increasing and
three times differentiable Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility index u() defined over
monetary payoffs. His expected utility under an effort allocation (a,b) and when principals a
and b respectively provide incentive wages xi j and yi j is therefore given by
7(1) ,)b ,c(a  )y  +  xu(  (b) q (a) p   = c) u , ; y  ,x ; b  ,U(a j ij iji
j i
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where c(a,b) denotes the agent’s cost of effort. The latter is assumed to be positive, strictly
convex and twice continuously differentiable. Furthermore, it exhibits strict substitutability
(supermodularity) in effort - that is: ca b > 0 at all values of the arguments (a,b),1 so a higher
effort on one task raises the marginal cost of effort on the other task.
The principals are risk neutral. Given principal b’s incentive wage yi j , a rational
principal a would thus set her incentive wage xi j in order to
(2)
U  c) u , ; y  ,x ; b  ,U(a    (PC)
  
c) u , ; y  ,x ; b  ,U(a maximizes  b)(a,    (IC)
 
:  to subject
 
] x     [  (b) q (a) p    maximize
*
j ij i
j ij i
j iiji
j ib  ,a     ,x j i
³
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Similarly, principal b’s best response to a wage schedule xi j would be a solution to
                                                          
1 Throughout this paper, the subscripts a and b denote partial derivatives with respect to the arguments a
and b respectively.
8(3)
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These two problems have different objectives but the same constraints. Constraint
(IC) is the so-called incentive compatibility constraint: given the incentive wages xi j and yi j ,
the agent would always select an effort allocation that maximizes his expected utility.
Constraint (PC) is the familiar participation constraint: the agent is willing to work under
incentive wages xi j and yi j only if he can achieve his reservation utility level U*.
Problems (2) and (3) define a game between the principals. The following definition
adapts to the present context Bernheim and Whinston (1986)’s formal notion of an
equilibrium.
Definition 1: A pair of incentive wages xi j and yi j together with an effort allocation (a,b)
constitute a common agency Nash equilibrium if [xi j ;(a,b)] solves problem (2) and
[yi j ;(a,b)] solves problem (3), and if each principal thereby gets her own reservation utility.
In the upcoming sections, equilibrium contracts are studied using a first-order
approach. The cumbersome - because it is infinite - set of constraints that must be checked
in order to satisfy (IC) is thereby replaced by the more tractable first-order necessary
conditions for an interior maximum of the agent’s expected utility, that is:1
                                                          
1 Throughout this paper the “prime” symbol ¢ denotes first-order derivatives of one-variable functions.
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This method is not misleading in the present context - meaning that the effort allocation
(a,b) engineered by the principals would always be a global maximum of the agent’s
expected utility - provided the following assumptions are met.1
ASSUMPTION 1 [MLRP - Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property]: The ratios pi¢(a)/pi(a)
and q j¢(b)/q j(b) are nondecreasing in i and j.
ASSUMPTION 2 [Generalized CDFC - Convexity of the Distribution Function Condition]:
The matrices [Ga b (i1 , j1 )] of second-order derivatives of the functions
(b) q  (a) p    = b)  ,a | j  ,iG( ji
J
j1 =j 
I
i1 = i
11 åå
are negative semi-definite, for all i1 , j1 , a, b.
ASSUMPTION 3 [Diverging Preferences]: In problems (2) and (3) the incentive
compatibility constraints represented by (4) and (5) are strictly binding.
The latter assumption entails in particular that the principals would like to see the
agent dedicate some positive effort level to each task (not the same level, of course; the
desired level might be quite large or rather small, depending on the principal). It can be met,
for instance, by having the agent’s cost of effort function decrease strictly when a and b are
                                                          
1 The stated assumptions are tailored to this paper, and they are generally stronger than necessary. For
weaker assumptions that still guarantee the validity of the first-order approach in multi-dimensional
settings, see Sinclair-Desgagné (1994).
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equal to zero, meaning that the agent exhibits some intrinsic motivation to work.
Assumption 2 is a two-dimensional version of the well-known Convexity of the Distribution
Function Condition, which captures a form of decreasing returns to effort. Assumption 1
means, finally, that higher assessments i and j make the expense of larger effort levels a and
b by the agent more likely.
The following intuitive property is a straightforward consequence of Assumption 1.
It supports the standard interpretation given above and plays an important role in validating
the first-order approach.
LEMMA 1 [Stochastic Dominance Condition (SDC)]: Under Assumption 1, we have that:
 ,0  (b)q     and   0  (a)p  j
J
j1 =j 
i
I
i1 = i
³¢å³¢å
for all i1 = 0, 1 ,..., I  and  j1 = 0, 1 ,..., J.
PROOF:
Let us concentrate on the pi’s. The proof for the q j ’s would be similar.
Since  1  (a)p i
I
0 ºå , we have that  0  (a)p i
I
0 º¢å . Consequently, if
 0  (a)p i
I
k <¢å for some k > 0, then it must be the case that  0  (a)p i
1k
0 >¢å
- . The former
implies that  0  (a)p *i <¢ at some i* between k and I, and the latter that pi**¢(a) > 0 at an
i** £ k-1 < i*, which contradicts Assumption 1.
This section will now end on a few clarifying remarks. First, the expected utility
defined in (1) does not mean that the agent cares exclusively about effort and money. While
intrinsic preferences for some positive amount of effort, for one of the tasks, or for attending
11
to a particular principal are not explicitly modelled, such preferences could be represented
within the present framework via a more specific function c(a,b). Second, it is implicitly
assumed that the first-order approach always yields some solutions to the principals’
respective problems. Constraints (4) and (5), furthermore, preclude a given solution to be
such that a = 0 and Ua < 0, or b = 0 and Ub < 0; a multitask problem that would only give the
latter would seem rather ill-defined. Third, the fact that the joint likelihood distribution of
(i,j) is a product pi(a)q j(b) does not entail that nothing can be inferred about, say, effort b
after output i only is observed, for the principals’ respective prior would reflect the fact that
a and b are linked through the agent’s cost of effort. This implies, however, that i and j are
sufficient statistics for a and b respectively. Finally, the inherent conflict between principals
is emphasized here by making their respective income depend on either i or j. On the other
hand, while the principals may have conceived and own separately the monitoring
technologies pi(a) and q j(b), it is assumed that, once an output level, say i, is observed by
principal a, it is also observed without additional cost by principal b. In this context the
upcoming sections will develop a scheme that would alleviate the present conflict, thereby
allowing to raise the power of the agent’s incentives.
II. TASK COMPLEMENTARITY AND THE MITIGATION OF CONFLICT
Someone usually (and too often rightly) expects that diverging preferences amongst
possibly interfering principals produce bilateral contracts that altogether deliver poor
incentives to the agent. A closer look at the properties of common agency equilibria,
however, may suggest some remedy.
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First note that, according to definition 1 and the first-order approach, the wage
schedule set by principal a in a common agency Nash equilibrium must satisfy the
following first-order condition:
(6)  
(b)q
(b)q
    +  
(a)p
(a)p
    +   = 
)y  + x(u
1
  :  x all for
j
j
i
i
j ij i
j i
¢
l
¢
gm
¢
aaa ,
where ma , ga , and la are the Lagrange multipliers associated respectively with the
participation constraint (PC) and with the incentive compatibility constraints given by (4)
and (5). A similar condition should hold for principal b, that is:
(7)  
(b)q
(b)q
    +  
(a)p
(a)p
    +   = 
)y  + x(u
1
  :  y all for
j
j
i
i
j ij i
j i
¢
l
¢
gm
¢
bbb ,
with mb , gb , and lb being the corresponding Lagrange multipliers. Notice that the
multipliers are nonnegative by construction. The monotonicity of rewards with respect to
output, which is a standard result in principal-agent analysis, thus follows directly from
assumption 1 and the fact that the function 1/u¢() is increasing. This important property
will be stated as a lemma.
LEMMA 2 [Monotonous incentives]: At an equilibrium, total wage must be increasing in i
and j.
This statement is of course valid only for the aggregate wage schedule xi j + yi j . To
see what may happen for xi j alone, say, let us consider principal a’s first-order necessary
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conditions for implementing an effort allocation (a,b). Since the incentive compatibility
constraints are assumed to be binding, these conditions reduce to:
(8)  
0  >  a   if0=
0  =  a   if0 
c) u , ; y  ,x ; b  ,(aU    +c) u , ; y  ,x ; b  ,(aU   +] x    [ (b)q (a)p  j ij ib aj ij ia aj iiji
j i
£
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and
(9) 
0  >  b   if0=
0  =  b   if0 
c) u , ; y  ,x ; b  ,(aU  + c) u , ; y  ,x ; b  ,(aU  + x (b)q (a)p   j ij ib bj ij ib aj iji
j i
£
lg¢å- aa
after applying the Envelope Theorem. Note that the second-order partial derivatives Ua a and
Ub b must be negative, because the assumptions supporting the first-order approach imply
that the agent’s expected utility is concave.
Suppose now that the cross-derivative Ua b is also negative, and consider the latter
condition which has principal a implement an amount of effort b on the task that was
assigned by the other principal. Let x(a,b) = å pi(a)q j(b)xi j be the expected wage paid by
principal a given the effort allocation (a,b) ; condition (9) then indicates that an equilibrium
at a positive amount of effort b > 0 must have
(10) 0 < x (b)q (a)p   = b)(a, x j iji
j i
b ¢å  ,
i.e., the agent’s expected compensation from principal a decreases when more effort is
devoted to task B. This clearly affects principal b’s incentive provision: in view of the
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statement of Lemma 2 principal b has therefore to deliver incentives which are sufficiently
powerful to counter the impact of (10). A symmetric situation occurs at task A. At an
equilibrium with positive effort levels, each principal thus provides disincentives to work
for the other principal and finds it at the same time harder and more costly to motivate the
agent on the task she cares about; low-powered incentives are naturally the overall result.
Clearly, a different conclusion could hold if the cross-derivative Ua b were instead
positive. In this case tasks A and B would exhibit some complementarity, in the sense that
the agent’s marginal utility of effort on one task would increase after putting more effort on
the other task.
Definition 2: Tasks A and B are called complementary (substitutes) for the agent if
Ua b > 0 (< 0).
To get a positive cross-derivative Ua b , however, one needs to overcome the assumed
supermodularity (i.e. ca b > 0) of the cost function, which makes the agent tend to decrease
effort on one task after increasing it on the other task. Some solutions have recently been
proposed in principal-agent settings (see Sinclair-Desgagné, 1999, and Glen A. MacDonald
and Leslie M. Marx, 2001). But common agency bears the additional challenge to make
competing principals actually coordinate in creating complementarity between tasks. This
challenge is taken up in the upcoming section.
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III. IMPLEMENTING TASK COMPLEMENTARITY
This section will now formalize the contingent-monitoring scheme outlined in the
introduction. The scheme’s precise structure is first explained, together with the reasons it
may create complementarity between tasks. Another subsection then derives sufficient
conditions for the scheme to be implemented by competing principals.
A. Upper-Tail Contingent Monitoring
In the preceding sections, as in most instances of common agency, the principals
would always observe the output on each task. From now on let this be true for task A only,
and let principal b appraise the agent’s performance on task B and share this information
with principal a according to a probability n i that depends on the observed output level i.
This defines a contingent monitoring scheme. Under this scheme, principal a offers wages si
while the output on task B remains unknown, and wi j otherwise; and principal b rewards the
agent through a schedule t i j only after seeing j.
The agent’s expected utility under an effort allocation (a,b) and a pair of contracts
involving two wage schedules (s i ,wi j ) on part of principal a, and a monitoring probability
plus a conditional wage schedule (n i ,t i j ) from principal b, is now given by:
(11)
 .b)  ,c(a )] su(  ) n  (1  +  )t  +  wu(  n [  (b)q (a)p  
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Take the cross-partial derivative of this expression. This gives:
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(12)
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Since ca b > 0, the latter can only be positive if the sum on the right-hand side is made
positive. A combination of monitoring probabilities and incentive wages that satisfy the
following conditions would clearly achieve this.
· Upper-Tail Monitoring: ni > 0 only if pi¢(a) > 0.
·· Joint Incentives on task B: For all i, [u(wi j + t i j ) – u(si )] has the same sign as q j¢(b).
According to Lemma 1, pi¢(a) and q j¢(b) are positive (resp. negative) at larger (resp.
smaller) values of i and j. The proposed scheme thus corresponds to the one described
previously: it is made up, first, of upper-tail contingent appraisals (i.e., n i > 0 if and only if i
is strictly larger than some threshold î ), and second, of appraisals that penalize low output
on task B but that also reward good showing on that task (to be sure, wi j + t i j > si if and
only if j is greater than the output level j* above which q j¢(b) becomes positive).
The next subsection will now examine whether and when such a scheme would
arise as a common agency equilibrium.
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B. Wealth Effects and Sufficient Conditions
Under contingent monitoring by principal b (and using the above first-order
approach), principal a’s incentive wages si and wi j will be set as if they were solutions to
the following optimization problem:
(13)
.  U  b)  ,c(a )]  s)u( n  (1  +  )t  + wu( n[ (b)q (a)p  
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Let ga , la and ma be the Lagrange multipliers associated with the incentive and the
participation constraints respectively.1 The first-order conditions for a selected contract are
given this time by:
(14)
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1 Although the same notation as in the preceding section is used, the reader should be aware that the
above Lagrange multipliers, which are the only ones to be referred to from now on, would generally
take different values from those introduced in Section II.
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Meanwhile, if K denotes the (unsunk) cost borne by principal b for monitoring task
B, then this principal will select monitoring probabilities n i and incentive wages t i j which
(16)
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The corresponding Lagrange multipliers being given by gb , lb and mb, the first-order
conditions for a solution to this problem entail the following relationships:
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for the probability n i of monitoring task B.
Again, the Lagrange multipliers must be nonnegative by construction. Considering
(14), (15) and (17), therefore, a conclusion similar to the one of Lemma 2 holds.
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LEMMA 2*: The wage schedules si and (wi j + t i j ) are nondecreasing in an equilibrium of
the common agency defined by problems (13) and (16).
Subtract (14) from (15), furthermore. This gives:
(19)  
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The upshot is that the second property of the proposed scheme will necessarily hold at an
equilibrium, by Lemma 1. This fact is stated as a proposition.
PROPOSITION 1 [Joint incentives on task B]: In a common agency equilibrium,
si < wi j + t i j  if  and only  if  q j¢(b) > 0.
In the present rather general context, however, a common agency Nash equilibrium
may not feature upper-tail contingent appraisals. Intuitively, those appraisals constitute a
lottery which must give the risk averse agent an expected payoff that is positive enough, for
they would otherwise have the undesirable effect to deter high performance on task A.
Using such a device therefore involves an additional cost for principal b. This cost will
remain acceptable provided the agent’s risk aversion decreases sufficiently fast with his
wealth (which is greater at higher levels of i).
Let then r(z) = -u²(z)/u¢(z) denote the agent’s coefficient of absolute risk aversion,
and observe that
(20)  
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The rate of decrease of the agent’s risk aversion with respect to wealth can thus be measured
by the difference between r(z) and V(z) = -u¢¢¢(z)/u²(z). The term V(z) is precisely the
coefficient of absolute prudence introduced by Kimball (1990). It can be shown that
V(z) > r(z) is actually necessary and sufficient for the agent to increase his holding of an
uncertain asset after an exogenous increase in wealth (see Kenneth J. Arrow, 1965, and the
recent discussion by John M. Hartwick, 1999). A more stringent inequality must hold here,
however, because in the present context the agent’s wealth is endogenous and stochastic
(via the incentives put on task A).1
ASSUMPTION 4 [Fast Decreasing Absolute Risk Aversion]: For all z Î  + : V(z) > 3 r(z).
This assumption amounts to requiring that the inverse of the agent’s utility function
have a third derivative which is negative. It is obviously violated when the agent exhibits
constant absolute risk aversion (CARA), as in Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) and Dixit
(1996). It is satisfied, on the other hand, if the agent’s utility takes the constant relative risk
aversion (CRRA) form u(z) = z1-w with a coefficient w smaller than 0.5.
Under Assumption 4 the following lemma asserts that the agent will indeed seek to
have his performance monitored on task B.
LEMMA 3: At a common agency equilibrium, )su(>)t+wu( (b)q ij ij ij
j
å  for all i and b.
                                                          
1 In a recent paper, Marie-Cécile Fagart and Sinclair-Desgagné (2001) show that Assumption 4 is
sufficient and “almost” necessary (in a precise sense) for the optimality of upper-tail contingent
monitoring in principal-agent settings, provided K belongs to a plausible interval of positive real
numbers. The paper is available from the authors upon request.
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PROOF:
Equations (14), (15) and (17) imply that:
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And when Assumption 4 is true, one can check that the function u(Y()) is convex. The
lemma is thus a straightforward consequence of Jensen’s inequality.
Lemma 3’s proof made use of the fact that, by (15) and (17),
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for all i, j , which means that the wage gradients respectively set by the two principals must
coincide at an equilibrium. Together with (14) and (15), this property allows to rewrite the
left-hand side of condition (18) as follows:
(22) (b)q]   
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- .
Using a standard line of reasoning first adopted by Stanley Baiman and Joel Demski
(1980), and by Ronald A. Dye (1986), let us now treat i as if it took its values from a
continuum, and assume that the incentive wages are differentiable functions of i. The
derivative of N(i) is then:
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It follows from Lemma 2* that si¢ and (w. j + t . j )¢ are positive. Differentiating through
equation (19) with respect to i, furthermore, gives the following identity:
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The derivative of N(i) given by (23) is thus equivalent to
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We want N¢(i) > 0. Through condition (18) this would imply that the appraisals of
task B cannot occur upon observing some output level î while happening with smaller
probability at some i > î, so for a suitable range of the cost K we would get upper-tail
contingent appraisals. Note that the second term on the right-hand side of (25) is already
positive by the above assumptions and Lemma 3. This supports the following statement.
PROPOSITION 2 [No lower-tail monitoring]: If -si¢ + åq j w. j¢ ³ 0, then N¢(i) > 0 so î < i
implies that n î  £  n i .
In a context where principals fully cooperate it can be shown that -si¢ + åq j w. j¢ º 0
(see Sinclair-Desgagné, 1999). The latter term is then specific to common agency. It actually
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reflects the presence of externalities between principals. It is positive, which means that
principal a provides stronger incentives to work on task A when principal b intervenes, if
and only if principal b appraises the output on task B more often than if the two principals
cooperated. Such a situation seems rather plausible and would guarantee that N¢(i) > 0. But
there is also an easy way to satisfy Proposition 2’s assumption while inducing at the same
time an outcome which resembles the cooperative one: just impose that principal a offers
wages such that
(26)  s = w  j , all For ij i .
This condition would bring about a somewhat “liberal” scheme, whereby principal a would
need to focus only on task A and would set her own incentive scheme ignoring the other
principal’s appraisals of task B.
IV. APPLICATIONS
For concreteness and in order to suggest possible refinements, this section will now
sketch some applications of upper-tail monitoring in common agency contexts. The outlook
is normative, although some analogies with existing schemes will be mentioned. The first
two applications pertain respectively to the role of the corporation and to that of public
servants in a democratic society, the third one addresses the governance of R&D. Those
topics share formal characteristics that agree rather well with those underlying the current
common agency model: different principals have a stake in and can monitor different tasks,
they are willing to share their appraisals, but they also compete to drive the agent’s attention
on to their own agenda.
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A. Corporate Compliance
In the long-standing debate about the aim of the business corporation - whether it
ought to concentrate on the benefits of shareholders and creditors or whether it should
pursue some wider form of “public interest,” economists have traditionally sided with
advocates of the former. The following statement, made several decades ago by Friedrich A.
Hayek (1960), is representative of the arguments that support this position.
The present tendency not only to allow but to encourage such use of corporate
resources [in the service of some “public interest”] appears to me as dangerous in
its short-run as in its long-run consequences. The immediate effect is greatly to
extend the powers of the management of the corporations over cultural, political,
and moral issues for which proven ability to use resources efficiently in production
does not necessarily confer special competence; and at the same time to substitute
a vague and indefinable “social responsibility” for a specific and controllable task.
In other words, asking corporate managers to maximize some “social welfare” function
instead of their firm’s profit would generate inefficient biases in resource allocation and
would soften up corporate control.1
This position never meant, of course, that in the pursuit of their proper aim
corporations should not abide by some legal and moral rules. For if managerial decisions
affect investors, they certainly also bring externalities on a number of stakeholders -
employees, customers, suppliers, local communities, etc. Corporate compliance with
regulations that seek to temper those externalities, however, poses a number of theoretical
and practical challenges.
Consider, for example, the “Sentencing Guidelines” of the United States Sentencing
Commission. Enacted in 1991, they now pervade most regulatory regimes, including
                                                          
1 Of course, those arguments have since been refined and somewhat qualified. For a recent summary,
see Tirole (2001).
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securities, environmental and antitrust regulations. Their explicit purpose is to allocate
liability for corporate misconduct between the firm and its agents. They actually put
substantial responsibilities on firms for monitoring, preventing, detecting, and reporting
criminal conduct by their employees or other agents, thereby mandating specific
requirements for an effective compliance program which fulfillment can diminish
significantly a corporation’s risks of indictment and sentencing.1 Several legal scholars have
argued, however, that the Guidelines may not induce appropriate risk sharing and incentives.
On the one hand, “Following Congressional passage of the Sentencing Guidelines for
Organizations in 1991, there has been a notable shift of liability risk away from the entity,
one that now reflects a risk disequilibrium between firms and their agents.” (William S.
Laufer, 1999). On the other hand, “(...) perhaps in the exercise of bona fide business
judgment, firms choose compliance structures in which the values of motivation and
cohesion (not to mention out-of-pocket costs) often trump high-powered monitoring, thus
opting for higher compliance risk because it is the most sensible strategy.” (Donald C.
Langevoort, 2001) The upshot may be the so-called “Paradox of compliance,” i.e. the
observed positive correlation between the number of operating compliance programs and the
number of white-collar crime prosecution (see Laufer, 1999).
It seems in fact that “(...) pursuing the basic enforcement goals of (1) inducing
efficient activity levels and (2) minimizing the joint costs of misconduct and enforcement
(...) places different, and potentially inconsistent, demands on a corporate liability regime.”
(Jennifer Arlen and Reinier Kraakman, 1997) As far as crime prevention and deterrence is
concerned, however, the scheme that is proposed here could be helpful. Imagine that the
firm’s shareholders and creditors stand as “Principal a,” the regulator as “Principal b,” and
                                                          
1 Dan K. Webb and Steven F. Molo (1993) report, for instance, that “The Sentencing Guidelines
reduce a corporation’s “culpability score” by three points if the offense occurred notwithstanding an
effective compliance program. A three-point reduction can decrease a convicted company’s fine range
as much as eighty percent (...).”
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the firm’s top management as the “Agent.” Let then “task A” correspond to directly
productive activities, while “task B” refers to compliance duties. The above analysis
suggests that the incentives set the regulator would actually reinforce those already chosen
by the firm’s shareholders and creditors to enhance financial results, while at the same time
the latter incentives would induce more frequent monitoring and so better control by the
regulator of corporate behavior and externalities.1
B. The Organization of Government
A fundamental principle of democracy is the division of powers. One immediate
corollary of this is that every agent in a government bureau is likely to have many principals
- not only a bureau supervisor but also, for instance, superiors in the Office of Management
and Budget, the White House, the courts, and several congressional committees. Moreover,
public agencies are likely to be assigned a set of heterogenous tasks to be done
simultaneously, such as collecting tax revenues and also answering questions and
complaints from the taxpayers. In his well-known analysis of public bureaucracy, James Q.
Wilson (1989) provides a typical example of the coordination and incentives problems that
may occur in such a context.
For many years the dominant doctrine of police professionalism was based on the
view that the police administrator had to get control of his department (...) to bring
to bear on the crime problem the methods of rapid response, scientific
investigation, and complete record keeping. (...) This in turn led the officers to
emphasize those aspects of their jobs that were most easily standardized and
recorded, that could be directed by radio transmissions, and that generated
statistics. These included writing reports on crimes (mostly thefts and burglaries
that occurred in the past) and making easy arrests (...). In short, one part of the
police job, order maintenance, was sacrificed to another part, law enforcement.
                                                          
1 Interestingly, an experiment with a scheme bearing the same features as the theoretical one that is
studied here and in Sinclair-Desgagné (1999) - i.e. a scheme involving upper-tail contingent
inspections which are perceived ex ante by the agent as a carrot rather than a stick - is currently under
way in the states of Delaware and Pennsylvania, in the context of industrial risks and public safety
regulation. An assessment of this experiment and its first (promising!) results can be found in James C.
Belke (2001) and Howard C. Kunreuther, Patrick J. McNulty, and Yong Kang (2001).
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The difficulty was that for many citizens order maintenance was more important
than law enforcement (...).
A widely observed and theoretically grounded solution to those problems is to
introduce low-powered incentives and control of the agents’ behavior via administrative
procedures (Tirole, 1994, Dixit, 1996). Applying the above scheme, however, let
“Principal a” be a police administrator, “Principal b” represent those citizens who give
priority to order maintenance, and the “Agent” be some team of police officers; clearly,
strong incentives for law enforcement could now remain in place, but diligence in law
enforcement would be fully rewarded only if citizens agree that the team did well also at
preserving order, while a team which is successful in crime prevention and conflict
resolution would get some recognition and payoff only by contenting as well the police
administrator.
This application also suggests a somewhat “proactive” approach to monitor
government agencies and public policy, which might alleviate some of the inherent
administrative and political costs of this activity. Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll and
Barry R. Weingast (1987) have pointed out that:
Policy monitoring in Congress takes two forms. The more apparent, but probably
less important, is ongoing oversight and evaluation by congressional
subcommittees and agencies that are arms of the Congress, such as the
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and the General Accounting Office (GAO).
Less apparent, but probably more important (judging from how members of
Congress allocate their time and staff), is “fire-alarm” monitoring. This form of
monitoring consists of disappointed constituents pulling a member’s fire alarm
whenever an agency harms them.
According to this paper’s contingent monitoring scheme, an additional “alarm” should also
be some high assessment by the CBO or the GAO. In addition to improving the agency’s
incentives, such a device could prevent some political “fires” from arising, thereby granting
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members of Congress more time and money for crafting new legislations, setting policies,
etc.
C. The Management of Innovation
Innovation is rightly seen as a key engine of economic growth. In trying to
understand incentives to innovate, economists have traditionally focused on intellectual
property. Yet, according to Stephen J. Kline and Nathan Rosenberg (1986), for example,
“(...) the overwhelming majority of the inventions recorded at the U.S. Patent Office were
never introduced on a commercial basis.” This calls for a finer analysis of the ingredients
and processes that produce innovations.
Several researchers have now emphasized that the challenge of innovation is to
integrate various bits of dispersed information (Martin Fransman, 1994) in a way which
“(...) balances the requirements of a new product and its manufacturing processes, the
market needs, and the need to maintain an organization that can continue to support all these
activities effectively” (Kline and Rosenberg, 1986). Formally speaking, this amounts to
considering the management of innovation as a multitask (see Holmstrom, 1989), multi-
principal issue.1 In such a setting the above scheme would point out that low-powered
incentives are no necessity and could perhaps supplement other instruments which are often
used in the management of innovation, such as stock options and tournaments.
                                                          
1 Multi-principal analyses of innovation management have appeared only recently in the literature. One
nice example is a recent paper by Bruno Versaevel (2001), in which a common agency model with
complete information is used to analyze the contracting externalities and appropriability problems
involved in the relationship between a research laboratory and two user-firms seeking innovations that
fit their respective specific demand and cost conditions.
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V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper has shown that, in many circumstances, one agent can be facing
relatively strong incentives to serve several noncooperating principals. The proposed
contingent monitoring scheme, which is optimal if the agent’s risk aversion decreases
sufficiently fast with respect to wealth, allows in fact the principals to coordinate in making
the tasks they respectively require complementary in the agent’s utility.
Several extensions and refinements of the present paper can now be foreseen. First,
the range of the cost K for which upper-tail contingent appraisals are still optimal needs to
be spelled out and compared with what would happen if the principals cooperated (an
objective akin to trying to assess the value of information in common agency and in
principal-agent contexts). Second, given the high level of commitment that is required on
the part of whoever consents to undertake contingent appraisals, some means to achieve that
commitment and ways to possibly relax it would be welcome. Third, in contexts where it is
not obvious who will monitor the agent continuously and who will make contingent
appraisals - as in the management of innovation application that was sketched above, for
instance -, one would need some guidelines in order to select the right principal to do the
right thing. In practice, finally, the performance threshold on task A above which contingent
appraisals occur should also depend on the available context and on the agent’s intrinsic
ability; the latter suggests an extension of the current model where the agent would have
privately-known type.
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